

# Incorporating Memory Into Financial Market Models

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# Introduction

Standard financial/economic models assume:

- Rational agents with unlimited processing power (Homo Economicus)
- Maximized utility functions/competitive equilibrium
- Correct and uncorrelated information
- Rational expectations — The 'Representative Agent'
- Perfect liquidity,...

Result:

Current prices accurately incorporate all past information and the system is Markovian.

## The reality:

- Irrational/psychological/memory effects
- Perverse incentives/moral hazard
- A 'less-than-perfect' information stream
- Significant coupling between agents eg. common (mis)conceptions, herding
- Liquidity risk, counterparty risk,...

Result ??:

### The stylized facts

- **fat-tails** — non-Gaussian decay of price returns
- **volatility clustering** — heteroskedasticity
- Excess volatility and trading








Figure: Simulation over 40 years (10000 time intervals)



## Arguments against Markovian markets

Micro-level:

- Anchoring
- Agents may have preferences (with framing) rather than utility functions
- Bounded rationality
- The concept of profit/loss is inherently non-Markovian
- Hysteresis

In addition, at the Macro-level:

- Economic shocks can have long-lasting effects...
- ... as can policy decisions

Remark: Volatility clustering is not necessarily a sign of market memory.

## Alternatives to the Markovian assumption

- The 'unit-root' explanation
- Memory-free but with 'hidden variables' and sensitivity to initial conditions
- Hysteresis
- True path-dependence

## Price-generating Models

These are attempts to mimic volatility clustering by replacing Brownian Motion with

- GARCH
- FIGARCH
- Fractional Brownian Motion
- ...

No economic understanding is required or generated.

## Probabilistic Switching Models

Lux-Marchesi (1999).

There are  $M$  agents — either ‘Fundamentalists’ (memory-free) or ‘Chartists’.

Agents can switch between the two groups.

There is a critical proportion of Chartists that causes bubbles etc

The effects disappear as  $M$  increases.

Probabilistic switching is unrealistic and leaves no room for behavioural economics.

# Artificial Markets

The Santa-Fe Institute

Agents choose the best-performing strategies at their disposal (à la El Farol).

Memory is present via evolutionary effects on both beliefs and prices.

The decision-making processes are very complicated.

# Hysteresis

Simple *hysterons* are often used to mimic sunk-costs.

The aggregate behaviour depends only upon a subset of past input extrema.

However the concept of a unique equilibrium is gone.

## A Threshold-based Model

Cross, Grinfeld, L. & Seaman.

The usual, efficient market, pricing formula (drift-free geometric Brownian motion) is:

$$p_{n+1} = p_n \exp \left[ \sqrt{h} \Delta W_n - \frac{h}{2} \right].$$

We replace this by:

$$p_{n+1} = p_n \exp \left[ \left( \sqrt{h} \Delta W_n - \frac{h}{2} \right) f(\sigma_n) + \kappa \Delta \sigma_n \right].$$

- Agent  $i$  switches when  $p(n) \notin [L_i(n), U_i(n)]$ .
- After each switching a new  $[L_i, U_i]$  is generated.

## Modeling Assumptions

We introduce a separation of timescales:

'Fast agents' — react to exogenous information/noise.

'Slow agents' — react to changes in price.

The 'Price Threshold Assumption':


These threshold values contain all of the past experience and future expectations of the slow agents.

The fast agents are not simulated directly.

## Remarks

- The market is non-Markovian
- Each pair of thresholds is a current ‘trading strategy’
- The threshold dynamics can mimic important phenomena — behavioural economics, inductive learning, . . .
- The anchoring effect and transaction costs/inertia are automatically captured
- If  $f \equiv 1$ ,  $\sigma_0 \approx 0$  **AND there is no coupling between agents** then we obtain efficient market pricing.
- System properties are independent of  $M$ .

**Herding:** For agents *in the minority only* the thresholds move together.



Perverse incentives can be modelled in a similar manner.

Volatility clustering can be mimicked by setting  
 $f(\sigma_n) = 1 + \alpha|\sigma_n|$ .

Remember that herding may be irrational or rational-but-perverse.

## Closing Questions

- How are assumptions unwound — all together or LIFO?  
Do different agents unwind at different speeds?
- How to model the reinterpretation of old information? Is this the cause of volatility clustering?
- Can all memory effects be adequately modelled using price history?
- Analagous to rational expectations, which memory effects cancel and which do not?